How Guinea Can Tackle Terrorism Threats from Mali

Guinea has not faced attacks from violent extremist groups yet, but the threat from nearby Mali is increasing. The recent indictment of 11 suspected members of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in Guinea’s gold mining area shows how vulnerable the country is to the instability in the central Sahel region.

Militant attacks in Mali, close to the Guinean border, have become more common in the last two years. There have been strikes on a police checkpoint, a customs post, and Chinese mining sites near the border.

This year, the Yanfolila checkpoint in Mali, which is 50 km from Guinea, was attacked on 16 March. On 4 July, JNIM broke into the Kéniéroba prison where several suspected terrorists are held. Since early May, JNIM has been disrupting cargo convoys on the Bamako-Kourémalé route to Guinea.

Guinean authorities are aware of the terrorist threat. On 22 April, President Mamady Doumbouya set up an interagency Special Operations Command centre to prevent and fight terrorism. This is part of a plan that started with the Special Forces Group in 2018 and expanded to include the Rapid Intervention Forces Group in 2021.

These security measures assume that the threat is external and should be stopped by force when it crosses into Guinea. But this view ignores the country’s own internal weaknesses. Some of these issues need non-security solutions to stop armed groups from gaining a foothold.

Three main problems in northwestern Guinea need attention: ongoing conflicts between communities, weak governance of artisanal mining, and entrenched trafficking networks. The insecurity at the border exposes these issues and could create a space for extremist groups.

On the poorly marked 858 km border between Guinea and Mali, ongoing tensions arise from disputes over gold resources. On 12 April, there were clashes between gold miners from the Malian village of Danka and those from Sèkè Kolenda in Guinea’s Siguiri prefecture over a mining site. This fight led to a young Guinean hunter being decapitated, causing unrest among local women.

Similar incidents have happened before. While they are not the main way terrorists gain a foothold, they can trigger the spread of violent extremism. This situation is similar to findings from the Institute for Security Studies in other parts of the region.

Another issue is the weak regulation of artisanal and small-scale mining by the Guinean government. In 2025, artisanal gold made up 69 percent of Guinea’s total exports, totaling 49.6 tonnes, much of it from this border area. Many informal miners come from Burkina Faso and Mali.

Just like in Burkina Faso near the borders with Benin, Niger, and Côte d’Ivoire, this area could become a financial hub for violent extremists who take advantage of the illegal gold trade and smuggling routes.

Illegal arms trafficking and smuggling networks are common in this border area. Violent extremists could use these illegal economies to meet their logistics needs, similar to patterns seen across the region.

The supply crisis in Mali has led to a rise in fuel smuggling. Since September 2025, JNIM has been blocking traffic on key trade routes linking Mali to Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. They aim to weaken Bamako economically by cutting off essential goods.

Due to ongoing insecurity on the main Dakar-Bamako and Abidjan-Bamako routes, the Conakry-Bamako corridor is now being promoted as an alternative route by Malian authorities. This change might prompt JNIM to increase activities along the Bamako-Kourémalé route.

Given these internal problems, Guinea needs to reassess its view of the threat. Responses should go beyond military action to focus on the weaknesses that can lead to violent extremism. This starts with understanding the full scale of these risks.

Guinea needs a national counter-terrorism plan that combines military actions with broader governance reforms. Under the new Special Operations Command, this plan should improve border security and increase surveillance to stop terrorist infiltration.

Strengthening cross-border security also means renewing military ties with Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal. Sharing intelligence and boosting joint patrols will be key to cutting off illegal trafficking networks.

A major challenge for regional security cooperation is the tension between the Economic Community of West African States and the Alliance of Sahel States. However, the Senegal River Basin Development Organisation, which promotes economic growth, could start military cooperation among Guinea, Mali, and Senegal.

Local communities should take an active role in grassroots surveillance and information-sharing networks. This requires stronger cooperation between the military and civilians to build trust and involve locals in preventing threats.

In the long term, these security measures must be paired with efforts that address the root causes extremists exploit. A good start would be to formalize and oversee artisanal mining. The ministries of mines, security, and defense must work together to improve regulation and monitoring, controlling financial flows and stopping these areas from becoming sources of terrorist funding.

Since these issues cross borders, Guinea must collaborate with Mali to harmonize informal mining regulations. Better oversight could reduce chances for extremist financing and ease tensions between communities caused by gold mining.