JNIM’s Blockade Threatens West Africa’s Trade

On 25 April, Mali faced a series of coordinated attacks by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). They targeted Kati, Mopti, Sévaré, Gao, and the capital Bamako. These attacks resulted in many casualties and the assassination of Defence Minister Sadio Camara.

In response, Malian authorities launched a counter-offensive and arrested several suspects. Those arrested included civilians, active-duty soldiers, and personnel previously dismissed from the army.

Five days after the attacks, JNIM set up a blockade around the capital, focusing on the western routes. The road between Kita and Bamako is blocked, trapping hundreds of people and making it hard to supply food and water.

This blockade is also affecting trade. Traffic on the Kayes-Bamako route has come to a halt. The blockade has now led to attacks on transport convoys along the Conakry-Bamako route, which used to be safer.

Since September 2025, Mali has faced a strategy aimed at cutting off essential supplies. By targeting fuel convoys in the south and west, JNIM is crippling commerce and trade in the country. This situation is spilling over into other countries, threatening regional economic activity.

West African countries depend on trade. Ports in coastal states are key gateways for the central Sahel region. The road corridors connecting these ports to Sahelian capitals are lifelines, many of which go through areas controlled by JNIM.

The Dakar-Bamako corridor is crucial for both Senegal and Mali. It is the most affected by insecurity in western Mali. In 2024, Mali was Senegal’s biggest customer, accounting for 26.5 percent of Senegal's exports, which is about 802.8 billion FCFA or $1.42 billion. In the first nine months of 2025, Senegal's exports to Mali were estimated at 662 billion FCFA or $1.17 billion.

Senegal’s Directorate of Forecasting and Economic Studies says that JNIM’s attacks in western Mali have greatly affected trade between the two countries since 2024. Between September and November 2025, the Port of Dakar saw a daily blockage of about 120 containers heading to Mali. This led to an estimated monthly loss for Senegal of 15 billion FCFA or $26.54 million. By late November 2025, over 2,000 containers were stuck in Dakar. By February 2026, around 4,000 empty containers were stuck in Bamako, with truck drivers afraid to return to Dakar.

This situation has greatly reduced Mali’s supply of fuel products, cement, and food. It also threatens the livelihoods of thousands of drivers, traders, and freight forwarders. Other corridors, especially those linking ports in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Benin to the Sahel, might face similar problems.

In 2025, Mali was Côte d’Ivoire’s top customer in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). The Abidjan-Bamako corridor is key for Mali’s supply of fuel and food products. By the end of 2025, about 1.47 million tonnes of goods were transported through this corridor, which has faced JNIM attacks in the Sikasso region.

Côte d’Ivoire is also Burkina Faso’s main supplier of fuel, electricity, and fertilizers. Imports into Burkina Faso generally come from or pass through Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Senegal. On 14 February this year, JNIM attacked and killed seven Ghanaian tomato traders in Titao, northern Burkina Faso, highlighting the dangers on the road between the two countries.

With the terror threat strongest in Mali, authorities have taken steps to respond. They have allowed military-escorted fuel convoys to bring in around 200 to 300 tanker trucks each week since last November. The government has also signed an agreement with Malian petroleum companies to speed up customs processes and reduce black market activities.

Le Monde reported a truce between Bamako and jihadist groups until Eid al-Adha in exchange for 100 detainees accused of terrorism. But attacks have continued, and Mali’s army says no negotiations took place.

The attacks on 25 April show the limits of Mali’s military approach to terrorism. Even though JNIM and FLA can join forces for major attacks, the Sahelian and coastal states struggle to form alliances.

JNIM’s blockades highlight the need for stronger protection of trade routes. Governments and regional groups like ECOWAS, the Alliance of Sahel States, and others must work together to stop JNIM's tactics from spreading to other routes.

Efforts to combat terrorism could drive much-needed cooperation between West Africa’s coastal states and the Sahel.