JNIM's Blockades Threaten Trade in West Africa

On 25 April, Mali faced a series of coordinated attacks by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). The attacks hit towns like Kati, Mopti, Sévaré, Gao, and the capital Bamako. This led to many casualties, including the killing of Defence Minister Sadio Camara.

After the attacks, Malian authorities launched a counter-offensive. They arrested several suspects, including civilians and active-duty soldiers, as well as some who had been dismissed from the army.

Five days after the attacks began, JNIM started a blockade on the capital. The blockade mainly affects the western routes. The road between Kita and Bamako is blocked, leaving hundreds of people stranded. This has made it hard for people to get food and water.

The blockade also disrupts trade flows. Trade has stopped on the Kayes-Bamako route. The blockade is leading to attacks on transport convoys along the Conakry-Bamako route, which was previously seen as safe.

Since September 2025, Mali has faced a strategy to cut off essential supplies. JNIM has intensified attacks on fuel convoys in the south and west. This is crippling trade and commerce in Mali. The impact goes beyond Mali, threatening economic activities in the region.

West African countries rely on trade. Coastal states’ ports are the main entry and exit points for the central Sahel. The road corridors that connect these ports to Sahelian capitals are lifelines. Most of these routes pass through areas where JNIM operates.

The Dakar-Bamako corridor is crucial for both Senegal and Mali. It is heavily affected by instability in western Mali. In 2024, Mali was Senegal's biggest customer, making up 26.5 percent of Senegal's exports, which is about 802.8 billion FCFA or $1.42 billion. In the first nine months of 2025, Senegal's exports to Mali were around 662 billion FCFA ($1.17 billion).

Senegal’s Directorate of Forecasting and Economic Studies reported that JNIM's attacks in western Mali have greatly affected trade between the two countries since 2024. Between September and November 2025, the Port of Dakar saw an average blockage of 120 containers bound for Mali each day. This meant Senegal lost about 15 billion FCFA ($26.54 million) monthly. By late November 2025, over 2,000 containers were stuck in Dakar. By February 2026, around 4,000 empty containers were trapped in Bamako, as truck drivers were scared to return to Dakar.

This situation cuts down Mali's supply of petroleum products, refined goods, cement, and food. It also affects the livelihoods of many drivers, traders, and freight forwarders. Other trade routes, especially those linking ports in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Benin to the Sahel, could also be at risk.

In 2025, Mali was Côte d’Ivoire’s largest customer in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). The Abidjan-Bamako route is key for Mali’s supply of petroleum and food. By the end of 2025, about 1.47 million tonnes of goods were moved via this corridor, which has faced JNIM attacks in the Sikasso region.

Côte d’Ivoire is also the top supplier of petroleum products, electricity, and fertilizers to Burkina Faso. Imports into Burkina Faso either come from or pass through Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Senegal. On 14 February this year, seven Ghanaian tomato traders were killed in a JNIM attack in Titao, northern Burkina Faso, showing the dangers on the road between the two countries.

With the terror threat most serious in Mali, authorities have taken steps. They started military-escorted fuel convoys, allowing about 200 to 300 tanker trucks to enter weekly since last November. The government also signed a deal with Malian petroleum companies to speed up customs procedures and limit refueling to fight the black market. They are also working to ease congestion in Dakar and Abidjan by moving trade to other ports.

Le Monde reported a truce between Bamako and jihadist groups until Eid al-Adha in exchange for 100 detainees accused of terrorism. Yet, attacks have continued, and Mali’s army has denied that any negotiations took place.

The attacks on 25 April show the limits of Mali’s military response to terrorism. While JNIM and the FLA have worked together for these major attacks, Sahelian and coastal states struggle to form alliances.

The regional effects of JNIM’s blockades stress the need for joint protection of trade routes. Governments and regional bodies, like the Economic Community of West African States, Alliance of Sahel States, and WAEMU, must act to stop JNIM's tactics from spreading to other routes.

Efforts to fight terrorism could help build much-needed cooperation between West Africa’s coastal and Sahelian countries.